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Abstract: The article explores one of the causes of the financial crisis of 
2008 and of financial crises generally.  The argument of the paper is that rather 
than tend toward equilibrium, financial and asset markets have a tendency to 
become unstable after prolonged periods of stability.  The main driver of this 
process is the expansion of credit.  Debt feeds its way into higher asset prices 
which in turn justify the accumulation of more debt to purchase further assets, and 
so on.  The basis for the idea is Hyman Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis, 
itself a reinterpretation of The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money 
by J.M. Keynes.  The main proposal the article suggests is that monetary and 
regulatory policy should become more stringent as the boom proceeds, since even 
rational individuals cannot be expected to refrain from perpetuating the cycle. 
INTRODUCTION 
Apart from its ruinous and protracted impact, one of the most remarkable 
aspects of the recent financial crisis is surely its seemingly endless list of causes.1  
Much like Agatha Christie’s Murder on the Orient Express2 in which all the main 
                                                          
*Candidate for L.L.M., Fordham University School of Law, 2011. 
1 The large number of books and articles that have been written about the subject in a relatively 
short period of time is arguably testament to this. 
2 AGATHA CHRISTIE, MURDER ON THE ORIENT EXPRESS (Reissue Ed., Harper Paperbacks 2011) 
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suspects are implicated, the net of culpability has been cast wide, to catch 
everything from risky mortgages to misunderstood financial innovation, skewed 
incentives at investment banks, and regulators asleep at the wheel.  Some 
commentators have even gone so far as to suggest that China’s one-child policy 
played a part in the debacle,3 while others blame whoever was not listening to 
them before the crunch.4   
Countless rules have been proposed and enacted in response, many 
invariably involving more government powers and oversight.5  This is 
understandable – to an extent – given that there have indeed been widespread 
regulatory shortcomings.6  However, and as this paper will suggest, more 
regulation will not prevent another crisis if it does not address the underlying 
deficiencies of the financial system.  Despite President Obama’s claim that the 
Dodd-Frank Act will prevent another crisis from “ever happening again,”7 history 
shows that regulation designed “for the last crisis does not prevent the next.”8  
Higher accounting standards, for example, introduced earlier this decade did 
nothing to prevent the recent fiasco.  In order to formulate an effective regulatory 
response, a close look at the underlying nature of the financial system is needed. 
This paper will try to do just that.  It will look at what it is about the financial 
system that makes it so prone to waves of bubbles followed by recessions, and how 
government policies – both regulatory and monetary – have contributed to the 
fiasco that has engulfed the global economy in recent years.9  Part I will look at a 
number of economic theories in order to attempt to explain the system’s inherent 
weaknesses, and Part II will try to shed some light on recent events in this context.  
Part III will look at what the regulatory response should be. 
The main argument of this paper is that, rather than settle for an optimal 
equilibrium, the financial system is in fact inherently unstable, and, after periods of 
stability, ends up in a self-reinforcing spiral towards instability.  The expansion of 
credit is the key driver behind this process.10  It fuels the cycle, helps create asset 
                                                          
(1934) (renamed “Murder in the Calais Coach” in the U.S.). 
3 Posting of Patrick Love to OECD Insights, Chinese demography: One child, many consequences, 
http://oecdinsights.org/2010/03/26/chinese-demography-one-child-many-consequences/ (Mar. 26, 
2010).  Introduced in China in the late 1970s, one of the effects of the policy has been a proportionally 
higher number of boys in relation to girls.  Id.  Worried about their sons’ prospects of finding a bride, 
Chinese families feel that the accumulation of wealth is one way to compete for the attention of brides-
to-be.  Id.  It is suggested these savings have contributed to the global imbalances and loose monetary 
policy in the West, in turn contributing to asset price bubbles and the ensuing crisis.  
4 See, e.g., GEORGE SOROS, THE CRASH OF 2008 AND WHAT IT MEANS: THE NEW PARADIGM FOR 
FINANCIAL MARKETS (2008). 
5 See, e.g., Dealbook, New S.E.C. Powers in Dodd-Frank Act, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2010; see also 
The Dodd-Frank Act, SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP & AFFILIATES COMMENTARY 
AND INSIGHTS, July 12, 2010, http://www.skadden.com/Cimages/siteFile/Skadden_Insights_ 
Special_Edition_Dodd-Frank_Act1.pdf. 
6 See, e.g., Michael Pomerleano, The failure of financial regulation, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2009 
available at http://blogs.ft.com/economistsforum/2009/01/the-failure-of-financial-regulation/. 
7 A decent start, ECONOMIST, July 1, 2010, available at http://www.economist.com/node/164 
81494. 
8 GEORGE COOPER, THE ORIGIN OF FINANCIAL CRISES, vii (First Vintage Books ed. 2008). 
9 See infra Part I.D.  
10 See infra Part I.D. 
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bubbles, leaves debtors woefully ill-prepared to cope with shocks and prolongs the 
hangover that inevitably follows.11  It follows that any serious attempt to prevent a 
repeat of the crisis should aim to manage the credit creation process as well as the 
accumulation of debt.  The implication is that regulatory policy should become 
progressively more stringent as the boom proceeds, as even rational individuals 
cannot be expected to refrain from perpetuating it.   
Of course, systemic risk cannot be eliminated, and the idea would not be to 
purge the system of crises altogether, but to reduce the risks they pose while 
increasing the financial system’s resilience.12  The paper will also recognize the 
limitations of regulation or any other proposals: if the system is indeed inherently 
unstable then no amount of intervention – by central banks or regulators - will be 
able to eliminate the risks we face, short of a switch to a different system 
altogether.  In addition, economic theories are of course just that, and each will 
have a counterargument, which raises the question of whether these theories should 
form the basis of policy responses at all. 
I. THEORY 
A. Why Financial Markets are Different 
Of all of Adam Smith’s insightful statements, the notion of an “invisible 
hand”13 is surely the most famous.  In its original context, the term implied that 
society’s interests are best advanced through an individual’s pursuit of his own. 
However, today the phrase is widely interpreted to mean that markets tend towards 
equilibrium; that is, a situation where demand and supply are in balance.14  If for 
some reason that balance is disturbed, the market will adjust and move towards a 
new equilibrium.15 
This, in essence, is the basis for the efficient market hypothesis.16  The 
premise of the hypothesis is that the price of an asset reflects all available 
information, and thus that all prices are in fact correct and in equilibrium.17  If 
asset prices are too low, informed buyers will promptly take advantage of these 
and drive the price back up, just as overvalued assets would attract short sellers 
who will drive the price down again.  The theory has been extremely influential: It 
has formed the basis of the federal securities laws,18 court decisions interpreting 
                                                          
11 See infra Part II.D. 
12 William Murden, Director, U.S. Treasury, Office of Int’l Banking and Sec. Mkts, Speech 
presented at the Derivatives and Risk Management Symposium on Stability in World Financial Markets 
at Fordham University School of Law, Banking Supervision and Government Policy: The Role of 
Regulators in International Financial Reform (Jan. 28, 1999) http://law2.fordham.edu/publications/ 
articles/600flspub9510.pdf. 
13 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS book IV, ch. II (1776). 
14 COOPER, supra note 8, at 93. 
15 MATTHEW BISHOP, ESSENTIAL ECONOMICS A-Z (Bloomberg Press 2d ed. 2009).  
16 Although this does not imply that Smith himself would have agreed with the claims made on 
behalf of the efficient market hypothesis today. 
17 BISHOP, supra note 15. 
18 WILLIAM ALLEN ET AL., COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATION (Aspen Publishers 3d ed. 2008). 
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them,19 and the financial engineering that takes place on Wall Street.20   
Notably, efficient market hypothesis does not allow for the existence of 
bubbles nor do adherents of the theory believe that government intervention to 
respond to them is justified until after these have burst.  Writing about the real 
estate mania of the time, the Chicago Tribune of April 13, 1890 summed up the 
elements of a bubble: “men who bought property at prices they knew perfectly 
well were fictitious, but who were prepared to pay such prices simply because they 
knew that some still greater fool could be depended on to take the property off 
their hands and leave them with a profit.”21   
Economists differ in their opinions on the causes of the existence of bubbles, 
but a salient feature is a rise in the price of assets that cannot be explained by 
fundamentals, i.e. the income likely to be earned from holding the asset.22  This is 
at odds with the efficient market hypothesis, which posits that prices are always 
justified. 
For the market in goods and services, this is a plausible argument.23  Yet 
whereas people buy a consumer good because of its inherent value, they buy 
financial assets for a different reason: to make them financially better off.24  When 
they invest, they are therefore looking for an asset which is scarce, the supply of 
which cannot be increased easily.  As Ben Bernanke explained before becoming 
Chairman of the Federal Reserve, “[l]ike gold, U.S. dollars have value only to the 
extent that they are strictly limited in supply.”25  “By increasing the number of 
U.S. dollars in circulation,” he went on to say, “the U.S. government can also 
reduce the value of a dollar in terms of goods and services.”26  Likewise, if the 
supply of assets could be increased at no cost, they would have little value as an 
investment.  Public companies could certainly issue additional shares whenever 
their price reaches a certain level (thereby diluting the wealth of existing holders), 
but those in the habit of doing so routinely would soon have difficulty attracting 
investors.27   
Instead of demand stimulating supply, in asset markets a lack of supply 
                                                          
19 See, e.g., Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 892 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1989); Seaboard World 
Airlines v. Tiger Int’l, 600 F.2d 355, 362 (2d Cir. 1979). 
20 Efficiency and beyond, ECONOMIST, July 16, 2009, available at http://www.economist.com/ 
node/14030296. 
21 BISHOP, supra note 15. 
22 Id. 
23 When demand for a good goes up, so does its price.  This is then met with an increase in supply 
as producers take advantage of the situation to maximize their income.  Once demand for the product 
falls again, perhaps because consumers have consumed enough of it or a competitor enters the market, 
the producer will lower his prices to accommodate this new level of demand, and there is a new 
equilibrium. 
24 Buttonwood: A special case, ECONOMIST, Aug. 21, 2010, available at http://www.economist.com 
/node/16792858. 
25 Ben S. Bernanke, Governor, Fed. Reserve Bd, Remarks Made Before the National Economists 
Club, Washington, D.C.: Deflation: Making Sure “It” Doesn’t Happen Here (Nov. 21, 2002) (available 
at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2002/20021121/default.htm). 
26 Id. 
27 COOPER, supra note 8, at 8. 
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stimulates demand, and rising asset prices are seen as a cause to buy.28  Rather than 
move toward equilibrium, prices can thus steadfastly move away from it.  The way 
consumers and investors react differently to supply constraints and price changes 
indicates that an altogether different mechanism seems to operate in the financial 
and asset markets,29 and one might question if there is another paradigm through 
which the financial system can be evaluated. 
B. Reflexivity 
George Soros’ concept of “reflexivity,” published in 1987,30 itself a re-
interpretation of older non-economic theories, echoes this belief.31  In sociology, 
the theory reflects the notion that individuals will act according to their 
calculations of how they believe others will act.32   
Soros believes that as applied to economic theory, it is the bias of 
participants in the market and their imperfect understanding that drives events.  It 
is not the sole driver,33 but its presence is enough to “render the equilibrium 
position unattainable.”34  While markets have numerous participants with 
individual biases, these may cancel each other out to leave what he terms the 
“prevailing bias,” with a stock’s price the common denominator.35  A change in 
this price (which way will depend on whether the prevailing bias is positive or 
negative) will further affect this bias, and so on.36  As the interplay is on-going, 
there is no tendency toward equilibrium, and the variables reinforce each other in 
one direction before going on to another after a particular event.37 
This statement is of course merely an elaborate way to describe the business 
cycle, or boom and bust.  The model takes into account that stock prices are also 
driven by the “fundamentals” of earnings, dividends, cash flow and the like: the 
reinforcing process therefore does not operate unrestrained, but undergoes orderly 
corrections.  However, this tends to happen in the early stages.  As the cycle 
advances, these corrections become scarcer and the likelihood of a bust grows.38  
Thus, rather than move toward equilibrium, Soros asserts that asset markets 
                                                          
28 A special report on the future of finance: Wild animal spirits, ECONOMIST, Jan. 22, 2009, 
available at http://www.economist.com/node/12957779. 
29 Id. 
30 GEORGE SOROS, THE ALCHEMY OF FINANCE: READING THE MIND OF THE MARKET (1987) 
[hereinafter ALCHEMY OF FINANCE]. 
31 See, e.g., GEORGE SOROS, THE CRISIS OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM (1998); THE CRASH OF 2008 AND 
WHAT IT MEANS: THE NEW PARADIGM FOR FINANCIAL MARKETS, supra note 4 (expanding upon 
Soros’s theory). 
32 In sociology this is known as the “Thomas Theorem,” named after sociologist William I. 
Thomas.  Robert K. Merton, The Thomas Theorem and the Matthew Effect, 74 SOC. FORCES 379, 389 
(1995).  As he put it, “if men define situations that are real, they are real in their consequences.”  Id. at 
380.  In other words, prophecies may well turn out to be self-fulfilling. 
33 ALCHEMY OF FINANCE, supra note 30, at 43. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 52. 
37 Id. at 70. 
38 ALCHEMY OF FINANCE, supra note 30, at 52. 
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actually have a tendency to move away from it.  
C. Introducing the Financial Instability Hypothesis 
The accumulation of debt has the capacity to greatly accentuate this process.  
That is the view expounded by Hyman Minsky, an American economist who spent 
much of his career analyzing financial crises.39  His hypothesis,40 in his own 
words, is a theory of “the impact of debt on system behavior,” and his key 
observation was that people’s attitudes to risk – and thus debt – develop in 
stages.41  In each stage a different type of economic unit (with its own income-debt 
characteristics) dominates the economy, with each unit more cavalier in its 
approach to risk as time goes on.42  He divided these units into three categories: 
hedging, speculative, and Ponzi.43 
Hedging units are borrowers that have sufficient cash flows to finance 
payments of principal and interest, and the equity component in their financing 
structure is relatively sizeable.44  If this type of financing is prevalent, the economy 
is more likely to tend toward equilibrium.  Speculative units are those borrowers 
who have enough income to meet interest payments but cannot afford to pay their 
entire obligations, and have to issue new debt to finance their existing liabilities.45 
Ponzi units, the most unstable, are those borrowers whose cash flows will at some 
point be insufficient to meet their obligations, and depend on the liquidation of 
assets or rising asset prices in order to refinance and honor their debts.46   
An economy’s financing stages are thus either stable or unstable, and it is the 
confidence (some might say complacency) that prolonged periods of economic 
stability and growth bring that moves an economy from one stage to the next.47  As 
Walter Bagehot, a 19th Century editor of The Economist observed, “people are 
most credulous when they are most happy.”48  In assuming the future will be like 
the recent past, consumers as well as companies develop the mistaken belief that 
such conditions will continue.49  They extrapolate recent trends into the future, 
become more predisposed toward making investments, and are willing to take on 
more debt.  Bankers, as “merchants of debt,”50 have the incentive to lend as much 
as possible, and susceptible to the same bias, are only too happy to oblige.  
                                                          
39 See Justin Lahart, In Time of Tumult, Obscure Economist Gains Currency, WALL ST. J., Aug. 18, 
2007, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118736585456901047.html. 
40 HYMAN P. MINSKY, STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY (McGraw Hill 2008) (1986) 
[hereinafter STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY].   
41 Id.; Hyman P. Minsky, The Financial Instability Hypothesis 6 (Jerome Levy Econ. Inst. of Bard 
Coll., Working Paper No. 74, 1992), http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp74.pdf. 
42 Buttonwood: Minsky’s moment, ECONOMIST, Apr. 2, 2009, available at http://www.economist. 
com/node/13415233. 
43 STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY, supra note 40, at 7. 
44 Minsky, supra note 41. 
45 STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY, supra note 40, at 79. 
46 Id. at 226. 
47 Minsky’s moment, supra note 42. 
48 Wild-animal spirits, supra note 28. 
49 Minsky’s moment, supra note 42. 
50 STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY, supra note 40, at 279. 
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D. The Problem with Debt 
Despite the advice that Polonius gives his son in William Shakespeare’s 
Hamlet to “neither a borrower nor a lender be,”51 borrowing has its merits.  It gives 
the thrifty an opportunity to earn interest on their savings, and allows individuals 
and companies to consume more or make investments which could otherwise not 
have been made, contributing to economic growth.52  Furthermore, it can enable 
risk to be efficiently allocated between parties.  However, it has an important side 
effect, namely that it feeds its way into asset prices.   
Minsky himself partly attributed his ideas to the works of J.M. Keynes and 
the Polish economist Michał Kalecki, who made the assertion that the structure of 
aggregate demand determines profits.53  To escape from the “paradox of thrift,” in 
which a section of the economy undermines its own income by saving and thus 
reducing the income (and demand) of other sections, Keynes reckoned that if one 
agent – the government – would spend enough money, it could boost demand and 
increase profits, setting off a benign cycle of economic expansion.54  Whereas 
Keynes’ General Theory emphasized the aggregate quantity of investment which 
through the spending multiplier affects output, Minsky’s contribution was to focus 
on how the investment is financed.55  Minsky took Keynes’ position a step further, 
and argued that the accumulation of debt could lead to a self enforcing spiral.56  As 
the availability of credit reaches higher levels, so does disposable income and thus 
demand.57  This in turn feeds into higher profits and, consequently, higher asset 
prices, thereby ratifying the decision to borrow more money to spend on these 
assets.58 
Soros’ theory takes into account the effects of credit on the reflexive process, 
namely on the relationship between the number of loans being made and the value 
of collateral.59  As borrowing stimulates economic activity, higher profits and asset 
prices also raise the value of collateral.60  More lending can thus positively affect 
borrowers’ creditworthiness, enabling them to borrow even more.61   
                                                          
51 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET.  Although Polonius’ chief concern was that lending money to 
friends would cause resentment (putting the lender at risk of losing his money as well as his friend) 
rather than any financial crises.  Id. 
52 BISHOP, supra note 15. 
53 Minsky had even declared that his hypothesis was “an interpretation of the substance of Keynes’ 
General Theory.”  Paul McCulley, The Shadow Banking System and Hyman Minsky’s Economic 
Journey, Global Cent. Bank Focus, May 2009, http://media.pimco-global.com/pdfs/pdf/GCB%20 
Focus%20May%2009.pdf?WT.cg_n=PIMCO-US&WT.ti=GCB%20Focus%20May%2009.pdf. 
54 COOPER, supra note 8, at 119. 
55 Dimitri B. Papadimitriou & L. Randall Wray, Minsky’s Stabilizing an Unstable Economy: Two 
Decades Later, in STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY, supra note 40, at xi-xxxv (McGraw Hill 
2008) (1986). 
56 COOPER, supra note 8, at 119. 
57 Papadimitriou & Wray, supra note 55, at xxiv. 
58 Id. 
59 ALCHEMY OF FINANCE, supra note 30, at 81. 
60 COOPER, supra note 8, at 100. 
61 For example, consider an economy with one bank and only one company, whose stock is worth 
$100 million and consists of 1 million shares of $100.  A broker might buy these at $100 and sell them 
at $101.  The broker’s customer, looking to invest, buys 100 of them and the broker, noting the increase 
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The problem however is that as this process continues, prices of assets stop 
reflecting their underlying value, and instead reflect the amount of credit available 
as well as people’s (biased) expectations of what the future holds, and a bubble is 
formed.  Note that at this stage the ability of investors to objectively judge the 
correct price of assets is significantly undermined.62  As credit creation, profit 
formation and asset price inflation all affect each other, it becomes apparent that 
the fundamentals which themselves reflect cash flows fail to provide investors with 
any external measures of value.  Bernanke has stated that Minsky and 
Kindleberger, in arguing for the inherent instability of the financial system,  “have 
had to depart from the assumption of rational behavior,”63 but once one takes into 
consideration how the fundamentals are themselves unreliable it seems entirely 
rational for investors to be misled by balance sheets.  Unfortunately, in the midst of 
rising asset prices, the incentive to refrain from borrowing and investing is muted, 
and by relying on these figures investors themselves also fuel the boom.  As an 
inherent feature of the system, credit expansion thus has the propensity to 
perpetuate the economic cycle.   
Unfortunately, it does more than just that.  Leverage can enhance returns on 
equity, but it also exposes the borrower to additional risk,64 as payments to 
creditors stay fixed regardless of incomes.  When these dwindle or costs rise, the 
highly leveraged debtor – such as the subprime borrower – is more likely to face 
insolvency, and excessive levels of debt thus leaving individual borrowers badly 
positioned to absorb adverse shocks.  As the economy reaches a stage where Ponzi 
financing dominates, a change in investor sentiment, or attempts by the authorities 
to purge inflation through monetary constraint, the risk grows that speculative units 
become Ponzi units.  These, in turn, see their net worth vanish, as rising interest 
rates mean their expenses rise above their incomes, and they are forced to liquidate 
their assets in order to repay their loans, triggering a fall in asset prices.   
The word “credit” is Latin in origin, and comes from the word “credere,” or 
“to believe.”65  Creditors must believe their borrowers to be creditworthy; if they 
suspect otherwise, they might demand payment of existing debt or refuse to roll it 
over.  Lending – like a Ponzi scheme – thus depends on confidence.  Large build 
ups of debt in continuous need of refinancing – like Minsky’s Ponzi units – make 
an economy especially prone to crises of confidence.66  These units, with little to 
                                                          
in demand, now sells them at $102, while buying them at $101.  The bank, meanwhile, notes that its 
customers are now holding $1 million in extra collateral, and its risk management systems are telling it 
that it can safely lend another $1 million.  Borrowers who take the bank up on its offer meanwhile see 
that stock prices have gone up, and invest the money they borrow in shares, pushing up the price even 
more, in turn affecting the value of their collateral.  See COOPER, supra note 8, at 103 (providing a 
modified version of this example). 
62 Id. at 119. 
63 Rajiv Sethi, Dynamics of Learning and the Financial Instability Hypothesis, 56 J. ECON. 39, 41 
(1992), http://www.springerlink.com/content/lq36n26607x46475/fulltext.pdf 
64 RICHARD. S. CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 45 (4th ed. 
2009). 
65 A special report on death: Repent at leisure, ECONOMIST, June 24, 2010, available at http:// 
www.economist.com/node/16397110.  Rather ominously, the Aramaic words for “debt” and “sin” are 
the same.  Id.   
66 KENNETH S. ROGOFF & CARMEN M. REINHART, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT CENTURIES OF 
FINANCIAL FOLLY 25 (2009). 
GLOSSOP_-_FORMAT_COMPLETE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/18/2012  5:59 PM 
2011 INHERENT INSTABILITY OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 491 
 
no margin for error, are thus extremely vulnerable to shocks, most notably rises in 
short term interest rates, the drying up of liquidity or a fall in asset prices, all of 
which played a role in propagating the recent crisis.  The key is that a seemingly 
trivial event – such as a change in investor sentiment, attempts by the authorities to 
purge inflation through monetary constraint or the unexpected failure of a firm 
previously considered in good health67 - is enough to generate a violent downturn 
when there is an excess accumulation of risky debt.68 
E. Destabilizing a Stable Economy 
The gist of Minsky’s thesis is simple: that, as memories of recession fade, 
the spurious belief that asset prices can only climb takes hold, and indebtedness 
deepens as it is used to finance investments.69  This in turn perpetuates an asset 
price spiral upwards, inducing a speculative euphoria – irrational exuberance in 
Alan Greenspan’s words70 – and, as the process continues, more borrowing.  In the 
process, economies become susceptible to shocks and more unstable.  Debt reaches 
unsustainable levels, and a small shock is sufficient to send the system crashing.  
Charles Kindleberger likened the economic situation after a few bubble years to a 
young person riding a bike.71  There is no middle ground, and the bike, like the 
economy, will become unstable lest its momentum is kept.  As Ponzi units with 
cash shortfalls are forced to liquidate their positions, asset values collapse,72 
leading to more defaults and further rounds of price reductions.  Concerns that 
asset prices will further fall thus becomes a self fulfilling prophecy.73  As the 
payments system freezes up, so does credit.  Runs extend to healthy as well as 
unhealthy banks, the economy is deprived of one of its main lifelines, and 
businesses that find themselves unable to raise financing go bust.74  Recession 
follows.   
A core difference between the efficient market hypothesis and the financial 
instability hypothesis is what makes prices move.  Whereas the efficient market 
hypothesis posits that any movement in price is caused by external shocks, the key 
to Minsky’s model and Soros’ theory of reflexivity, is that it does not rely on these 
exogenous shocks to move the economy into a particular direction, but instead 
generates its own cycles, causing waves of credit expansion and asset price 
inflation which perpetuate themselves.  Booms and busts are thus inherent in the 
                                                          
67 CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER & ROBERT Z. ALIBER, MANIAS, PANICS AND CRASHES: A HISTORY 
OF FINANCIAL CRISES (5th ed. 2004). 
68 ROBERT J. BARBERA, THE COST OF CAPITALISM: UNDERSTANDING MARKET MAYHEM AND 
STABILIZING OUR ECONOMIC FUTURE 33 (2009). 
69 See supra, Part I.D. 
70 Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Remarks at the Annual Dinner and Francis Boyer 
Lecture of the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C.: The 
Challenge of Central Banking in a Democratic Society (Dec. 5, 1996) (available at http:// 
www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/1996/19961205.htm).  
71 KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 67. 
72 STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY, supra note 40. 
73 KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 67. 
74 A survey of the world economy: On credit watch, ECONOMIST, Oct. 18, 2007, available at http:// 
www.economist.com/node/9972531. 
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system, and stable economies effectively sow the seeds of their own destruction. 
The notion that assets are always correctly priced – as propagated by the 
efficient market hypothesis – is the main argument against countercyclical policies 
and pricking bubbles, even their existence; until they burst that is, when they 
miraculously become clear for all to see, and prices are suddenly declared to be 
wrong, prompting central banks to intervene.  Defenders of the efficient market 
hypothesis also stoutly maintain that there is no such thing as an excessive level of 
credit creation.75  There are numerous events that have violated the theory, 
including bank runs in the absence of deposit insurance, or Long Term Capital 
Management’s implosion in 1998.76  However, widespread belief in the theory has 
been a driving force behind the deregulatory shifts over the last couple of decades 
(such as repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act) as well as central bank policy, setting the 
stage for the most severe bursting of a bubble since the Great Depression. 
II. REALITY 
Over the last few decades, the savings rate in the U.S. has fallen by more 
than 10%, from nearly 11% of GDP in 1985 to around 1% of GDP in 2008.77  This 
means that households have increased their spending by more than 10% of GDP, 
some of which has invariably found its way into higher asset prices.  Credit growth 
as a percentage of GDP78  and household debt79  have similarly shot up.  One of 
the causes of this shift from saving to spending has arguably been the Federal 
Reserve’s loose monetary policy.  “Money always seems free”80  in manias, wrote 
Charles Kindleberger, and this crisis was no exception.  Throughout the past two 
decades, cheap imports from emerging markets had kept inflation low, and the Fed 
was able to maintain a correspondingly low federal funds rate.  When interest rates 
are low, consumers and businesses do not just borrow money for everyday 
expenses, but also for the purchase of assets.  Unsurprisingly, homes shot up in 
value over the period, far outstripping gains in incomes.81 
Beginning in the 1980s, Congress passed a series of statutes that deregulated 
the residential mortgage market and contributed to the bubble.  The Depository 
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 198082 repealed usury caps 
on residential mortgages, and the Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act of 
198283 granted lenders more freedom to sell adjustable rate mortgages, effectively 
                                                          
75 COOPER, supra note 8, at 13. 
76 Id. at 13. 
77 U.S. BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF PERSONAL SAVING 11 
(2010). 
78 George Magnus, The Credit Cycle and Liquidity: Have we arrived at a Minsky Moment? PUBLIC 
RADIO, Mar. 6, 2007, http://www.publicradio.org/columns/marketplace/farrell/Economics%20 
Insights%20- %20By%20George%20-%20March%202007.pdf 
79 See Robert Guttmann & Dominique Plihon, Consumer Debt & Financial Fragility, 24 INT’L 
REV. APPLIED ECON. 3, 269 (2010). 
80 KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 67. 
81 BARBERA, supra note 68. 
82 Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act, Pub. L. No. 96-221, §§ 101-108, 
94 (1980).  
83 Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act, 12 U.S.C. § 3801 (1982). 
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transferring interest rate risk from lenders to borrowers.  The Federal Reserve was 
given the power under the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 199484 
to issue rules to restrict abusive lending practices, but Alan Greenspan, then the 
Fed’s chairman, declined to implement them, explaining later that case by case 
evaluations would have been needed to evaluate which loans were unfair.85  
Interestingly, the much maligned Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, which is 
often cited as a cause of the crisis, had decidedly little to do with it.  Critics assert 
the act “forced” banks to make loans in poorer communities which would have 
otherwise been unsafe and unsound,86 although it in fact merely encouraged banks 
to be aware of profitable opportunities in these areas.87  Figures show that CRA 
related loans accounted for only a small portion of subprime mortgages, and in any 
case actually compared favorably to other types of subprime loans.88 
In any case, many mortgage lenders operated with little oversight: The Wall 
Street Journal estimates that a few years before the crisis more than half of all 
subprime mortgages originated by companies that were not subject to federal 
supervision89 and banks were able to conceal from their borrowers the true 
implications of their contracts, while borrowers were no less adept at concealing 
their true financial position from their creditors.90  Coupled with low interest rates, 
the housing market boomed.  A 2004 study by the National Association of Realtors 
revealed that fully 23% of all houses in the U.S. had been bought as an investment 
(not for owner occupation) and another 13% were bought as second homes.91   
As homes increased in value, homeowners felt richer and were likely to 
spend more.  Two mortgage related innovations introduced in the 90s made this 
possible.92  First, banks facilitated the refinancing of existing loans, allowing 
borrowers to obtain lower interest rates, though at the cost of higher principal, 
depending on house price appreciation.93  Second, home equity loans were 
introduced, which were essentially second mortgages with the benefits of tax 
                                                          
84 Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1639 (1994). 
85 See Carol A. Needham, Listening to Cassandra: The Difficulty of Recognizing Risks and Taking 
Action, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2329, 2332 (2010). 
86 See, e.g., Lawrence H. White, Housing Finance and the 2008 Financial Crisis, CATO INST. 
(Aug. 2009), available at http://www.downsizinggovernment.org/hud/housing-finance-2008-financial-
crisis. 
87 See Randall S. Kroszner, Governor, Fed. Reserve Bd., Speech at the Confronting Concentrated 
Poverty Policy Forum, Washington, D.C.: The Community Reinvestment Act and the Recent Mortgage 
Crisis (Dec. 3, 2008) (available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/kroszner20081203 
a.htm. 
88 See Neil Bhutta & Glenn Canner, Did the CRA cause the mortgage market meltdown? 
COMMUNITY DIVIDENT, FED. RES. BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS, Mar. 2009, available at 
http://www.minneapolis fed.org/publications_papers/pub_display.cfm?id=4136. 
89 See J. Scott Colesanti, Laws, Sausages & Bailouts: Testing the Populist View of the Causes of the 
Economic Crisis, 4 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COMM. L. 175 (2010). 
90 Credit: Beware of miracle cures, ECONOMIST, Sept. 6, 2007, available at http://www. 
economist.com/node/9767665. 
91 The global housing boom: In come the waves, ECONOMIST, June 16, 2005, available at http:// 
www.economist.com/node/4079027?story_id=E1_QDSJDNS.  
92 Guttmann, supra note 79. 
93 Id. 
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deductible interest payments.94  Both effectively allowed homeowners to convert 
home equity appreciation into cash.95  
This extra spending fed into higher corporate profits and the economy 
thrived.  Defaults and insolvencies were fewer in number, and lenders became 
more willing to lend on lax terms. For example, the Office of the Comptroller, in 
its 2006 Survey of Credit Underwriting Practices, noted that due to competitive 
pressures, lenders had relaxed credit underwriting standards for a third year in a 
row.96  Homebuyers took advantage of these generous terms and low interest rates, 
relying on rising house prices to repay the loans, reflecting the third or Ponzi stage 
of Minsky’s hypothesis.97  Financing was made available based on the assumption 
that house prices would keep rising,98 and borrowers with loans of 125% of the 
value of the house were a typical example of Minsky’s Ponzi financing units.99  By 
2006, around one third of all homebuyers in the U.S. had purchased risky 
mortgages of some sort.100  
A collective wave of elation had seemingly taken hold.  Economic growth 
was robust, and rising house prices vindicated risky financing strategies.  As 
Kindleberger points out, there is always a sense that “we never had it so good” 
during an upturn.101  Because of globalization, improvements in technology and 
securitization,102 it was widely reckoned that “this time would be different.”103  As 
Minsky hypothesized, people believed the good times would continue, and 
borrowed staggeringly large amounts of money to buy assets.  Had the efficient 
market hypothesis been true, these might have been justified investments, or prices 
wouldn’t have risen by as much as they did.  Instead, asset prices merely reflected 
excessive credit creation and a specious euphoria.  Rising house prices encouraged 
borrowers to borrow more, and the high levels of debt they had accumulated were 
enough to leave them badly positioned to deal with adverse shocks.  A long period 
of stability had inevitably spawned its own instability, and when the shock came, 
the bubble inevitably ended not with a pop, but with a crash. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
94 Id. 
95 See id. 
96 See George Magnus, The Credit Cycle: Getting Closer to a Minsky Moment? (July 3, 2007), 
http://www.publicradio.org/columns/marketplace/farrell/George%20Magnus%20020707.pdf. 
97 See supra Part I.C. 
98 Buttonwood: Ponzificating, ECONOMIST, Mar. 15, 2007, available at http://www.economist.com/ 
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99 See Minsky’s Moment, supra note 42.   
100 BARBERA, supra note 68, at 34. 
101 KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 67. 
102 See ROGOFF & REINHART, supra note 66, at 20. 
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II. THE BUBBLE BURSTS 
In order to combat inflationary pressures as a result of rising energy prices, 
in April 2004 the Fed raised its funds rate from 1% by twenty-five basis points.104 
Seventeen105 consecutive interest rate hikes over the next few years eventually 
found their way into higher mortgage rates, and demand for new housing 
slackened.106  Faced with higher loan repayments, strapped homeowners started to 
default.  Risky mortgages bore the brunt of the defaults at first, but as waves of 
foreclosures saw the value of banks’ collateral fall, prime borrowers soon 
followed. 
The initial disruption may have been small, but it was enough to burst the 
housing bubble and eventually precipitate the economy into a descending spiral of 
margin calls, sour loans and a credit crunch leading to the soup kitchens.107  Just as 
the previously “virtuous” cycle of rising asset prices and profits had reinforced 
itself, so the damaging hangover that followed spiraled downwards in what is 
known as a positive feedback loop.  According to Soros, it is the sudden 
liquidation of accumulated positions that gives busts such a different shape: The 
frenzied liquidation of collateral in order to satisfy creditors leads to a rapid 
decline in collateral prices,108 thereby depriving many more creditors the chance to 
recover.  Minsky, too, recognized that as Ponzi units with cash shortfalls are forced 
to liquidate their positions, asset values collapse.109  Irving Fisher’s words, from 
the early 1930s, seem presciently appropriate today: 
Over-investment and over-speculation are often important; but they would have far 
less serious results were they not conducted with borrowed money.  The very effort 
of individuals to lessen their burden of debts increases it, because of the mass effect 
of the stampede to liquidate . . . . [T]he more debtors pay, the more they owe.  The 
more the economic boat tips, the more it tends to tip.  It is not tending to right itself, 
but is capsizing.110  
III. CAPITAL 
The demise of the subprime borrower went on to highlight the dangers of 
overleveraging at a different type of borrower altogether, namely financial 
institutions.  Banks and other financial firms, which had invested heavily in 
securities linked to subprime mortgages, saw the value of their assets drop and a 
number of them suffered crises of confidence resulting in bailouts and government 
rescue packages.  Many of these banks relied on short term financing to fund their 
operations while investing long in illiquid (and toxic) assets.  Their capital 
positions were flimsy: Lehman Brothers at one point had a debt to equity ratio of 
                                                          
104 See BARBERA, supra note 68, at 141. 
105 Guttmann, supra note 79, at 14. 
106 See BARBERA, supra note 68, at 141. 
107 COOPER, supra note 8, at 104. 
108 See ALCHEMY OF FINANCE, supra note 30, at 322. 
109 See STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY, supra note 40. 
110 Irving Fisher, The Debt-Deflation Theory of Great Depressions, 1 ECONOMETRICA 334, 337 
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35:1,111 and Bear Stearns had a similar ratio.112 
Northern Rock, a British mortgage lender, was a particularly painful 
reminder of the dangers of overreliance on money market funding and few deposits 
to rely on.  Despite starting the year promisingly and announcing pretax profits of 
£627 million ($1.2 billion) for 2006,113 it suffered a liquidity crisis it was not able 
to weather.  Fear that it would default in the future – thanks to its losses on 
mortgage securities – was enough for commercial money market lenders to refuse 
to renew its loans, sending it cap in hand to the British government.114  A few had 
previously voiced concerns about the practice of relying on short term financing.  
MIT alumnus and Italian banker Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, then on the Board of 
Directors at the ECB,  stated as far back as the beginning of the decade that for all 
its advantages, this type of “liquidity may be more prone to dry up when it is most 
needed.”115  Even Moody’s, which would go on to be widely berated for its 
fallacious ratings, warned of British banks’ vulnerability to disruption in the 
wholesale markets.116   
Many others, however, including regulators, failed to see this, and as a result 
of its funding problems, Northern Rock went on to suffer Britain’s first bank run in 
140 years.117  As its failure proved, a sudden lack of liquidity can destroy a balance 
sheet in a short period of time,118 and the implosion in 2007-2008 came about 
precisely because many highly leveraged firms financed their illiquid investments 
using short term borrowing119 which they were unable to renew.  
IV. PROTRACTION 
When the system does implode, the contraction is “a mirror image of the 
expansion.”120  Whereas growth during the boom was higher than it should have 
been, so the bust will be more severe.  According to Rogoff and Reinhart, the 
average downturn following a debt-fuelled housing bubble is four to six years – in 
sharp contrast to the “pure stock market crash”121 at the beginning of this century 
which, even though preceded by a record high composite index value, was a much 
                                                          
111 See Colesanti, supra note 89. 
112 Roddy Boyd, The Last Days of Bear Stearns, CNN, Mar. 31, 2008, available at http://money. 
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114 Helen Nugent, Northern Rock is bailed out by Bank of England, THE TIMES (UK), Sept. 14, 
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1866.  Douglas McWilliams, Northern Rock was a preventable crisis, INDEP., Sept. 18, 2007, available 
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preventable-crisis-402706.html. 
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SYSTEMS 27 (John Wiley & Sons 1998). 
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120 ALCHEMY OF FINANCE, supra note 30. 
121 ROGOFF & REINHART, supra note 66, at 162. 
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less protracted affair, with more benign growth rates and lower unemployment 
figures in its aftermath.122   
As the U.S., Britain, Ireland, Spain, and other countries set for periods of 
fiscal austerity are now discovering, households and companies paying off their 
debts will inevitably spend less money on consumption or investment, thereby 
depressing profits and keeping economic recovery fragile.  The debt build-up of 
the last few decades has been unprecedented in size, and, during the time required 
to reduce it, the U.S. economy (and others) will likely experience depressed rates 
of growth,123 which in turn will reduce tax revenues124 and employment prospects.  
Excessive levels of debt thus not only reinforce asset price spirals that end up 
destabilizing the economy, but they also amplify the severity of the ensuing 
downturn.  
V. ASIAN CRISIS 
The recent financial crisis was by no means the only one with credit at its 
root.  The unhindered expansion of credit also played a role, in varying degrees, in 
the Great Depression,125 the Japanese stock market crash of the late 80s, and the 
Asian financial crisis of the late 90s.126  The latter, in particular, shares a number 
of further traits with the recent crisis. 
For example, large numbers of banks in countries such as Thailand, where 
the weakness of the banking system was arguably the chief cause behind the panic 
that followed, were also highly leveraged (many in fact technically insolvent), 
leading the way for crises of confidence in which foreign investors fell over each 
other to withdraw their investments.127  Few countries in the region had banks with 
capital ratios even close to 8%.128  Thai banks excessively expanded credit during 
the upturn, employing weak credit controls.  Rather than assess cash flow or the 
strength of balance sheets, banks would lend solely on the basis of collateral.129  
Much of the money that was being lent found its way into real estate, which also 
was being used as collateral, further artificially inflating the bubble and allowing 
banks to look healthier than they were.  When the bubble burst, collateral turned 
out to be worth much less than banks had anticipated, and numerous banks were 
bailed out by their governments.130   
Furthermore, just as loose monetary policy, excess savings from abroad and 
                                                          
122 U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DATABASES, TABLES & CALCULATORS 
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124 Id. at 164. 
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127 Id. at 14-15. 
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129 Id. at 25. 
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sub-par lending standards helped fuel the boom in the United States prior to the 
recent crisis, during the Asian crisis an overflow of cash from developed 
economies resulted in overinvestment in unproductive assets and a similar 
misallocation of capital on a grand scale.  The financial crisis that engulfed Asia in 
the late 90s was due to structural weaknesses different from America’s today and 
eventually manifested itself in a currency panic.131  However, its underlying nature 
was the same: an investment boom fueled by easy money.132   
While the features of each crisis are never identical, there is often a similar 
pattern.133  The experience of the recent crisis, as well as that of the Great 
Depression and the Asian Crisis, suggest that the common denominator is the 
expansion of credit.  The similarities may therefore serve as an indicator that in 
order to avoid future crises or at least mitigate their impact, the availability of 
credit and levels of debt and bank capital are the key issues that need to be 
addressed. 
VII. PROPOSALS 
A. Credit Creation 
The cost of debt is measured by the interest paid on it, and interest rates – at 
least in the short to medium term – are determined by central banks, be it the 
Federal Reserve in the United States or the Bank of England in the U.K.134  
Through monetary policy, central banks manage the credit creation process.  
Although mandates vary,135 a key focus for many central banks is price stability, 
particularly consumer price inflation.  In addition, central banks act as lenders of 
last resort, in order to reduce the likelihood of bank runs by offering a form of 
insurance to depositors.136 
Low interest rates encourage people to borrow rather than save, as returns 
from savings decrease whereas it becomes cheaper to borrow.  Investors put 
money into bonds (of which prices move inversely to interest rates) and riskier 
assets such as stocks, which promise higher returns.  As it becomes cheaper for 
companies to fund acquisitions with debt, they go on a buying spree.  When the 
markets tumble, central banks intervene and will lower interest rates in order to 
stop the decline.  While politically expedient at the time, the pain is merely 
postponed as it simply encourages people to borrow again, “saving the economy 
from disaster but raising the stakes still further when the next crisis comes 
                                                          
131 DELHAISE, supra note 118, at 1.  
132 BARBERA, supra note 68, at 125. 
133 KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 67. 
134 See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: 
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136 On Credit Watch, supra note 74. 
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around.”137  Thus, central banks in effect exacerbate the credit cycle, fueling 
demand and stoking asset price inflation to create bubbles. 
While still a Federal Reserve governor, Ben Bernanke argued that it was 
simply not the job of monetary policy to target housing bubbles; instead, he 
thought, targeting housing bubbles should be the job of regulatory policy.138  As 
some of the blame for the housing bubble has rightly been reserved for residential 
mortgage deregulation, one can see why.  However, had a housing bubble been 
prevented, an asset bubble in another sector of the economy might have formed, as 
cheap money would have found its way into other types of assets.  Managing the 
credit creation process properly is therefore crucial if these damaging cycles are to 
be avoided.   
If central banks keep refusing to prick asset bubbles and continue to focus on 
consumer price inflation, this is highly unlikely to happen.  The most effective 
policy would surely be to have higher interest rates and require central banks to 
avoid the creation of excessive bubbles by preemptively pricking them before they 
reach a point where they pose a systemic risk.139   
By shifting a central bank’s mandate from targeting consumer price inflation 
to asset price inflation, its monetary policy would shift to the supervision of 
inherently unstable financial markets, thus “leaning against” the use of speculative 
and Ponzi finance.140  One possible way of achieving this could be to compare 
credit growth or growth in asset prices to the level of growth in an economy 
generally.  Other indicators that would inform a central bank when to act could 
include growth in lending activity, the stock of debt as a fraction of the economy, 
or the debt service burden as a fraction of income.141  The attraction of using these 
variables is that other macroeconomic data become distorted by financial bubbles, 
and so credit growth becomes the key variable.142  
Another possible solution would be to monitor credit spreads.  Some have 
suggested that bubbles form when risk appetites are high and credit spreads are 
tight,143 which was also apparent during the years in the run up to the crash of 
2007-2008.  If credit spreads had been monitored more closely by the Federal 
Reserve when it was raising interest rates in 2004 through 2006, it might have 
tightened policy in a more aggressive manner, and house prices would have fallen 
earlier, albeit followed by a milder recession.144   
The proposal is not without its flaws.  The main argument against the 
approach is that because it is impossible to identify the correct price of an asset, 
central bankers can only spot a bubble ex post.  However, this is marred by the 
assertion that asking central banks to spot bubbles does not necessarily involve 
                                                          
137 Buttonwood: credit and blame, ECONOMIST, Sept. 11, 2008, available at http://www.economist. 
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138 ROGOFF & REINHART, supra note 66, at 213. 
139 COOPER, supra note 8, at 164. 
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identifying the correct price of an asset, in the same way that central banks are not 
required to know what the appropriate prices of everyday goods are in order to 
monitor consumer price inflation.145  Both policies merely require an assessment of 
what an acceptable increase in price is.  However, this leads to another problem, 
which is that central banks will inevitably employ arbitrary benchmarks by which 
to measure acceptable increases in these variables.  If the central bank errs on the 
side of caution, the expansion will come to a halt sooner than it might otherwise 
have; taking a liberal approach will similarly prolong the boom, but make the 
downturn more serious.  There is a degree of truth to this.  However, it may be 
argued that much government intervention is arbitrary, but nevertheless desirable 
in that it achieves predictability and in this case a degree of stability. 
The real challenge, however, will likely come not from macroeconomic 
variables, but the electorate.  The cost of pricking asset bubbles and avoiding an 
aftermath bogged down by debt would invariably involve a larger number of 
smaller, less damaging credit cycles, which would still negatively impact the 
economy in their own ways.  Economic growth would certainly not be as high as a 
result, and shorter term cyclicality would likely negatively impact employment 
levels and asset prices.  As a rejoinder to these arguments, it is helpful to quote 
Ludwig von Mises on the subject: 
There is no means of avoiding the final collapse of a boom brought about by credit 
expansion.  The alternative is only whether the crisis should come sooner as the 
result of a voluntary abandonment of further credit expansion, or later as a final and 
total catastrophe of the currency system involved.146 
Credit, it has been noted, is an integral part of our financial system, and one 
which has its benefits if used appropriately.  If Minsky’s theories are indeed 
correct, an expansion of credit, unless halted by government, will end in a crash.147 
The dilemma before us, it thus seems, is simply how severe we want the downturn 
to be.  No outcome is without its drawbacks, but the key will be to convince voters 
that the costs associated with a credit fuelled expansion are simply too high, and 
that monetary policy cannot be used to counteract all economic downturns.148  
Given the ordeal the United States and other economies have been through in 
recent years, the choice should not be difficult. 
B. Capital Requirements 
The crisis may have had its origins in the subprime borrower, but, as noted 
above, it was the over-extended financial institutions that caused the system to 
crash.149  People tend to be guilty of the “sin of extrapolation” – that is, “they look 
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back at the performance of assets and extrapolate an even rosier future” – and 
bankers are no exception.150  Banks play a role not just in the perpetuation of the 
credit-asset cycle, but also in providing the catalyst to send the system downhill.  
Because of their over-reliance on debt, fractional reserve banking and other 
methods of short term financing, financial institutions are more susceptible to 
crises of confidence than firms in other industries.151  One study of banking crises 
has found these crises to be most common at the peak of a boom in house prices,152 
and there is empirical evidence that banking crises significantly amplify 
recessions.153  Therefore, improved regulation at financial institutions might 
therefore reduce the likelihood that these will pose a systemic risk.   
Minsky stressed that any regulation and supervision in banking would be a 
never-ending struggle, given that what might be “an appropriate structure at one 
time is not appropriate at another.”154  If we take Minsky’s hypothesis to its logical 
conclusion this is surely the correct analysis. Counter-cyclical policies could be an 
effective safeguard against the excessive build up of debt, while preventing 
institutions from becoming too fragile to pose systemic risks.  A key argument 
against higher capital requirements is that they reduce the amount of capital 
available for lending, and can thus dent growth and economic expansion.155  
Minsky’s insights, however, can be applied to suggest that capital restraints might 
be strengthened as the boom progresses, and the aim is to vary capital ratios 
according to credit growth and market circumstances.  If higher capital standards 
are imposed gradually as the cycle progresses, it will make banks more resilient, 
and thus would reduce speculative lending as fewer funds are available for 
borrowing.   
This approach will result in accumulating capital during upswings that are 
used as buffers during downturns.  Additionally, the variable – credit – used to 
determine the capital ratio, is flexible, and which ratio to maintain would depends 
on each bank’s circumstances, while still nevertheless restraining aggregate credit 
growth in a given economy; perhaps an increase in the value of a bank’s assets can 
provide a mechanism through which to determine appropriate levels.  This 
proposal mirrors Spain’s system of “dynamic provisioning,” to which there are 
several counter-arguments.   
First, the period through which banks would be required to hold higher levels 
of capital would presumably extend to economic downturns, thus reducing the 
amount banks can lend precisely when credit is already in short supply.156  Yet the 
scarcity of credit is a common feature that follows all banking crises as borrowers 
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default and force a pullback in other bank lending.157  Banks with low levels of 
capital may also resist the temptation to make loans out of fear that capital 
cushions are insufficient,158 and even relaxed capital requirements or improved 
liquidity may not encourage banks to lend more.  To quote, from an article by 
Andrew Ross Sorkin, an anonymous senior official at a big bank which had 
received money from the government: ‘“[i]t doesn’t matter how much [former 
Treasury Secretary] Hank Paulson gives us. . . no one is going to lend a nickel until 
the economy turns.’  The official then added: “Who are we going to lend money 
to?” before repeating an old saw about banking: ‘Only people who don’t need 
it.’”159 
Second, even though Spain’s banks came out of the crisis in relatively better 
shape than their Northern European counterparts, they were still heavily exposed to 
the real estate sector, and Spain has been grappling with Europe’s worst 
unemployment rates over the last few years.160  Note, however, that Spain’s 
unemployment rate never dipped below 8% even before the boom, and its current 
high rate is as much a result of its competitiveness and its restrictive labor 
regulations.161  Even if Spain did not escape unscathed, its rules nevertheless 
helped its banks avoid some of the catastrophes that countries such as Britain and 
the United States have suffered by preparing for the downside of the cycle.162   
There are two systems which can be used to implement dynamic 
provisioning: a formula driven system, which would depend on using a 
predetermined metric, and a discretionary system, that would require the bank 
regulator to judge what levels of capital would be feasible given the stage of the 
macroeconomic cycle.163  The success of the discretionary system would depend 
on the quality and the independence of the judgments made.164  In addition, the 
system would hinge – as with all rules – on how regulators, who don’t necessarily 
have the proper incentives, enforce it.  In the United States, the problem is one of 
interagency competition, with regulators competing for territory at the expense of 
prudent standards.165  In Europe, where a shift from national regulators to a 
European Union wide regulatory body is occurring, the danger is that risk is in fact 
exacerbated since the authorities in charge will not be the ones to pick up the bill 
when another meltdown occurs.166  All regulators are susceptible to lobbying.  For 
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these reasons, a formula based system would be more effective. 
Whether the requirements will help avert another meltdown might ultimately 
come down to how much capital they will require banks to set aside.  Spain’s 
provisions did not stop the rise in house prices, and when a boom is large enough, 
the impact of additional provisions can be marginal.167  For instance, core capital 
of around ten percent of risk-adjusted assets would have been sufficient to soak up 
the losses at most banks during 2007 through 2009.168  However, no feasible ratios 
will be enough to avoid distress at banks whose losses were several times those of 
the average bank,169 and firms such as UBS and Citigroup had write-offs that 
greatly exceeded the buffer built up by Spain’s larger banks.170  Furthermore, 
critics contend that dynamic provisioning, on its own, did not maintain the Spanish 
banks’ health, and the way off-balance sheet entities were treated played a critical 
part.  As a result of regulatory demands that firms set aside comparable amounts of 
capital against assets in off-balance sheet vehicles as against assets on the balance 
sheet, Spanish banks altogether avoided setting up special investment vehicles.171  
However, this result suggests that the proposals could be workable if carried out in 
conjunction with other structural reforms, including a tighter monetary policy, 
which might have prevented some of the excesses in Spain’s housing market. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper has argued that the financial system, rather than being self-
corrective, is in fact self-enforcing.  The financial system, if left to its own devices, 
is inherently prone to busts, rather than tending towards a stable equilibrium which 
would see continued economic growth and prosperity.  Or, to paraphrase Minsky, 
stability leads to instability.  Regulators would do well to bear this theory in mind, 
as individuals cannot be relied upon to hold back from perpetuating the cycle.  The 
key, therefore, would be to adopt progressively stricter measures that restrain the 
creation of debt and the level of indebtedness as the system edges closer towards 
instability. 
The main attraction of this counter-cyclical approach, as applied to central 
banks as well as financial institutions, is that it manages to balance two competing 
and vital concerns.  One the one hand, an over-zealous, one-size-fits-all approach 
to regulation of the economy may, at best, produce few benefits and, at worst, be 
counterproductive by stifling lending, innovation, and the efficient allocation of 
resources which have brought unprecedented prosperity to many parts of the world 
in recent decades.   
On the other hand, if regulators fail to implement the appropriate reforms, we 
are likely to see a repeat of the last few years—surely, a no less undesirable 
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alternative.  A regulatory approach that reflects Minsky’s ideas might thus allow 
the economy to go ahead, only pulling the reins as the economy overheats—or, in 
the now famous words of the longest-serving Federal Reserve chairman, William 
McChesney Martin Jr., “to take away the punch bowl just as the party gets 
going.”172  The suggested proposals reflect this idea.  
I have purposefully refrained from focusing on suggestions that would target 
some of the housing-market related deficiencies that contributed to the recent 
crisis, although a few initiatives might certainly go some way toward preventing 
another housing bubble.  More prudent supervision might certainly be in order, and 
lenders could be required to demand higher down payments on houses as the 
economic cycle progresses, which could be assessed through establishing whether 
houses themselves are overvalued as determined by rents.  This measure would 
reduce speculative borrowing, and reduce risk to borrowers through lower debt 
repayments.  In addition, more prudent supervision may require banks to 
progressively accept collateral of a higher value, or restrict the type of collateral 
that they can accept at the more advanced stages of the cycle.   
However, we should arguably look beyond the details of the recent housing 
bubble and instead improve the system that helped facilitate it.173  Churchill once 
quipped, “It is a joke in Britain to say that the War Office is always preparing for 
the last war.”174  Likewise, regulators and policymakers risk falling into disrepute 
if they continue to adhere to an idea of market efficiency that is replete with flaws 
while focusing on yesterday’s problems.  The attraction of the views expounded by 
Minsky reflects the notion that the narrative of the recent financial crisis followed 
his theories, and in the years leading up to the crisis, the housing market saw the 
unraveling of a Ponzi type scheme.175  The press has coined the phrase a “Minsky 
Moment” to describe the beginnings of the crisis, but Minsky’s work was not 
concerned with moments, but rather the long-term view of system’s structure.176  
The strength of his hypothesis is that it provides a framework through which to 
analyze not just this crisis, but others as well. 
Defaulting homeowners and bank runs were important sources of fragility,177 
as repeated rises in interest rates were enough to push many into default, with 
consequences that are now well known.  However, the frailty of borrowers 
extended beyond individuals and firms to economies as a whole: Iceland’s and 
Ireland’s debt-to-GDP ratios reached an astonishing 1,200% and 700%, 
respectively, before tumbling into crises178 from which they have yet to recover.  
Empirical work has shown that the risk of a crisis is greatly elevated when a 
housing boom is accompanied by a sharp increase in debt,179 and figures show that 
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countries with large current account deficits, such as Iceland, Ireland, Spain, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States, suffered some of the more severe banking 
crises at the end of the 2000s.180  If these anecdotes tell us anything, it is that the 
accumulation of debt can reach unsustainable levels.  Debt is a crucial driver of the 
processes that Minsky described, and, while the extension of credit can be the 
source of investment and wealth creation, it is also the source of financial 
instability.181 
Minsky himself was modest about his own policy prescriptions, declaring 
that he felt more comfortable “with [his] diagnosis of what ails our economy . . . 
than with the remedies” he proposed.182  Similarly, the suggestions here do not 
purport to act as a panacea and are not free from criticism.  Apart from some of the 
specific limitations mentioned above, a number of general limitations should also 
be borne in mind.  First and foremost, a vital component of the inherent instability 
of the system is that supposedly rational humans make it so; if this theory is 
correct, then surely the humans in charge of the regulators are no less prone to 
making the same mistakes.  Placing too much faith in regulation may miss the 
point that many financial innovations occurred in response to incentives created by 
the same regulations.183  Off-balance sheet vehicles and derivatives allowed banks 
to hold less capital, whereas credit default swaps allowed banks to convert risky 
assets that require higher levels of capital into assets that do not.184  The danger is 
that banks in the future will merely circumvent the rules through more innovation, 
employing even more dangerous methods of hiding risk.  While regulators “with 
spine are still better than invertebrates,”185 any solution that necessarily relies on 
regulatory bodies must recognize these limits.  These limits, however, should not 
be construed as indicative of the inevitable failure of improved regulations, but 
only as indicators of the existence of certain obstacles.  The design of today’s 
financial and monetary architecture is the best in history,186 and the tools at our 
disposal should nonetheless be sufficient to mitigate the effects of the system’s 
inherent instability, enhancing our prosperity in the long run. 
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